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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN S. JOHNSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

LATTER-DAY SAINTS
HOSPl'l'AL,,

Case No. 12970

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STA1'EMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff Calvin Johnson as a result of alleg('d negligent treatment by defendant hospital while he was confined therein as a patient,
and by plaintiff Robert Johnson, his father, to recover
medical ex1wnses incurred by him for the care and treatmt>nt of the injuries sustained by his minor son.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case ~wa:o tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Calvin Johnson in the amount
of $300,000.00 general damages, and in favor of plaintiff
Robert ,Johnson in the amount of $25,623.79 for special
damages (medical expense).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant
seeks reversal
of the judgment be1ow. an, ,
.
.
.
1
directions to enter a Judgment in favor of the de1·e11Ui.1.i1r
and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action or· ti·
'
Ill
alternative a new trial.
J'

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A - BACKGROUND AND UNDrnPU'l'ED FACT~

In December, 1967, plaintiff Calvin Johnson, here
inafter called Calvin, was a 16 year old high school bo!
At that time he developed signs and symptoms at t~,
lower end of his spine for which he consulted Dr. Cari
Brockbank, a general practitioner in Salt Lake Clh.
(R. 278, 452). Dr. Brockbank diagnosed the condi!ior
as a pilonidal cyst and recommended surgical exc1
sion. (R. 278). Calvin ·was accordingly hospitalizeh
the LDS Hospital on December 12, 1967. (Ex. 1; R
278, 453).
The following morning the cyst was excised rnr
gically by Dr. Brockbank as planned. (R. 453). Th
operation was performed under a spinal anesthetic nil
ministered by Dr. Eugene l\Iaier. (R. 280, 327-32~i
Supplies for the anesthetic were furnished by defendan'
hospital. (R. 282, 329, 334). The surgery proceedrii
uneventfully and unremarkably. (R. 285). At tit·
conclusion .of the surgical procedure the patient \\il'
· apparen tly goui
transferred to the recovery room m
condition. He was checked by the anesthesiologist :r
l · eturn t•
hour or an hour and a half later before us r

1

3
Jiif: own room. At this point everything appeared to be
satisfactory. (R. 353-354).

Calvin was returned to his room but as the afternoon progn~ssed his temperature increased, finally
reaching 103 ° :B'. ( J1~x. 1, pp. 95, 137; R. 696). The attending nurse notified Dr. Brockbank who prescribed
a:.;pirin, antibiotic and nrinary catheterization. (R. 290292, 296, 302, 320, 4G8-469, 696; Ex. 1, pp. 37, 137). However, Dr. Brockhank did not elect to visit or examine his
patient that ewning. (R. 296, 297, 303, 455, 471). During
the night it was discovered that Calvin had no use or
control over his legs and had not recovered from the
effects of the anesthetic. (Ex. 1, p. 137). Dr. Maier was
notified of this condition the follo\ving morning and
visited Calvin as soon as possible. (R. 363). Some time
afterward, Dr. Brockbank in the course of making rounds
also visited the patient and recognizing the seriousness
of the problem enlisted the services of Dr. Louis Schricker, a neurosurgeon, as a consultant. (R. 303, 730).
Dr. Schricker examined Calvin and made certain recommendations regarding further care. (R. 730). A few
days later (December 17) the entire care and responsihility of the patient was transferred to Dr. Schricker.
(R. 735).
Although various diagnostic tests were performed
and various medica1tions were administered, no significant improvement in the condition of Calvin could be
ohtained and he nmain!:'d a paraplegic with complete
loss of motor and sPnsory function of both lower extremi-
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tie~ and. of the bowels and bladder. (R. 741 ). He
11
marned 111 the LDS Hospital for a im·iod 0 f
·
.
appr<1x,
mately three months dunno- all of which t·
.
b
1me 1ie 11·.
mamed under the care of Dr. 8chricker (R '"36 .
· I , ti!:
Ex. • 1). He was also seen durincrb this iwriod of 1t'u11e 11,
vanons other specialists, including Dr. ~Iadison Thoma.
neurologist; Dr. Carter Ballinger ' anesthesiolocri,·t
:
to•O : a111J
Dr. Leonard J archo, neurologist. (Ex. 1, pp. 3, 36, 55-fiL
R. 736). Dr. ·William Stoops, neurosurgeon and partne•
of Dr. Schricker, also participated in his care. (Ex. l,
pp. 79-93 ; R. 736).
He was later transferred to the University Hospital
for rehabilitation trea:tment. He has remained a para
plegic cripple. (R. 741).
Plaintiffs initiall!' commenced this action againil
defendant and avpellant LDS Hospital, and against Dr.
Brockbank, the doctor who performed the surgery, a111l
Dr. Maier, the anesthesiologist. (R. 1-4). Innumerahl1
grounds of negligence were alleged as against all dt
fendants. See original pretrial order, (R. 112-118) anJ
second pre"trial order (R. 138-145). It will there be note.;
that plaintiff alleged no less than 26 specifications ol
negligence as against Dr. Brockbank at the time of th·
first pretrial and that this had expanded to 34 at the
time of the second pretrial. (R. 113-115, 139-Hl). Spei:
ifications of negligence againsit Dr. Maier increased fr 0111
23 at the time of the first pretrial to 26 at the timer'
the second pretrial. (R. 115-116, 141-143). Twenty-ow
.
claims of neg1igence
were asser t e d ag ain ~"t defendm1!
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hospital both in the initial preitrial order and in the sub;;cqnent pretrial order. (R. 117-118, 144-145).
The cm;(~ was seheduled for trial March 6, 1972. (R.
[Ji). On that date the defendant doctors entered into a
sdtleuwnt arrangement with the plaintiffs. Although
the terms of the settlement do not appear in the record,
it is awarent that plaintiffs agreed not to prosecUJte the
action against them further, and they did not participate
fnrther as parties, although both of them tes1tified at
trial. Trial of the ease as against defendant hospital was
continued until April 24, 1972. (R. 137).
Although tlH~ nrnltiple claims of negligence against
tlw hospital as set forth in ithe pretrial order were never
reduced in number by any formal order, at the conclusion
of the trial the claims of negligence as against the defendant hospital had boiled down to the single issue of
whether the hospital had used negligent or improper
cleansing techniques in cleaning its spinal anesthetic
t'quipment, in that it used a detergent solution for that
purpose, and had thereby permitted detergent contamination of its instruments resulting in the injury to Calvin. It was plaintiffs' theory that in some fashion, not
explained or supported by any evidence, but only inferred, that a minute quantity (trace) of detergent had
been permitted to remain on the spinal needle used to
anesthetize Calvin and that this had led to his injury.
(R. 509). It was defendant's contention, first, that the
use of' detergent for cleansing spinal instruments in December, ] 967, was in accordance with the standard of

6
care of this community, and further that the 't
'
mo~ Jn
bable cause of plaintiff's injury was a reaction t
.
d"
.
.
0 th1
anes tlie t ic me icahon itself, rather than to an d t
Y ee1.
gelllt contamination. (See record citations post.).
11

B - THE EVIDENCE AS TO NEGLIGENCE.

The only witness offered by the plaintiffs in an pf
fort to establish their theory of negligffilce was a Dr.
Peter Rocovich, a neurosurgeon of Los Angeles, Cali
fornia. (R. 471-473). Serious objections were raisedlr
defendant as to Dr. Rocovich's qualifications to testlf)
as to the standard of care of hospitals in this cmmnunlh.
(R. 483-493). On voir dire examination Dr. Rocorlcil
admitted that he was not and never had been licem~1i
to practice in the State of Utah, that he had never un
dertaken to practice or treat a patient in the State ni
Utah, that he had never visited a hospital in the Stateo!
Utah, that he had never received medical training in !11
State of Utah, that he· limited his practice to neurosurgery, that he had no acquaintance with any UM
physicians and surgeons and that he did not know wha1
techniques were being used by any hospitals in Utah for
cleansing of instruments at the time in question. (R.1~11•
482). Dr. Rocovich failed completely to satisfy th1
requirements of the Utah locality rule, i.e., of beinr
familiar with the standard of care in the same commum!!
Moreover he did not belong to a single specialty soc!eh
' scope, and had never d"iscusse d c1ean sing terl1
of national
niques with any Utah physicians. (R. 482-483). Howe:er
after considerable discussion, debate, and consideration
1
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the trial judge received his testimony as an expert on
the standard of care of hospitals in this community.
(R. 483-493, 500, 525, 529, 530).
Dr. Rocovich likewise failed fo establish any qualifications to speak on the lombject of technique of cleansing
of instruments. Admittedly, he was not and never had
been a hospital administrator. (R. 480). Neither was he
an anesthesiologist nor trained in their field of expertise.
(R. 480). He did not profess to have any personal knowledge of cleansing techniques used by any hospital, either
in Utah or in his own locality of practice. (R. 561). He
had never heard of Yale cleaner, the type of detergent
used by the hospital, as being the cause of any untoward
rt'actions. (R. 544). Thus he was permitted to testify
concerning the standard of care of a locality of which he
knew nothing, and in a field in which he esfablished no
qnalifications. The decision to receive his testimony was
of critical importance to the outcome, since absent his
testimony there would have been insufficient evidence
to take the case of the jury.
1

Dr. Rocovich had never examined the patie:nJt until
shortly before trial. ( R. 478, 479, 543). The opinions
\rhieh he was permitted to express were based upon his
examination of a copy of the LDS Hospital chart, x-rays,
copies of depositions of some of the witnesses and
answers to interrogatories which had been taken in
preparation for trial, and alleged research in the medical
literatnrr. (R. 479). However, with respect to the latter,
he \rns abk to identify only two articles or papers which

8
he had examined, and to identify these only i ,
. n \a~11"
and gen<>ral terms. (R. 541-542). He was unable t '
•
•
•
0 ,11\1
m1t the citation of a single medical authoritvJ upon w,1111',]1
he relied for the conclusions which he gav<'. (R. 5-H-54!
1

His conclusions in substance were that pontocaiIlr.
the anes1thetic agent, is completely safe for use in spinal
anesthetic if proper techniques arc used, that most re
ported cases of paraplegia or paralysis following spinal
anesthetic have been caused by some contaminant ra:tliti
than by the medi0ation itself, and that therefore sincet]1,
hospital used detergent to cleanse its instruments tht
probabilities were 1that Calvin's paraplegia resulted frn111
detergent contamination rather than from a reaction to
the anesthetic agent. (R. 543). He did admit, howmr.
that paraplegia resulting from spinal anesthesia ha~
been reported for more than half a century, and lone
before detergents were known or used. (R. 553).
He also opined that since the hazard of detemnt
contamination had been discussed in the medical lilera·
ture prior to 1967 it was negligencfi for defendant hoi
pital to use such a cleansing agent for the purpose 1
cleaning its spinal instrnments. (R. 525).
11

All medical witnesses agreed ithat there was sonw
hazard in all anesthetics including spinal anesthetic~
(R. 305, 306, 388-389, 422-423, 567).

. "ff s ' c1aim,
. d P f en dant prodnc111i
In opposition to plamh
.
rat
a series of witnesses to establish that its cleansmg P

!ices and procednreR were in accordance with the standard of can: of this community a1t the time in question.
:Hrs. Gladys Bolh described in detail the cleansing
procrss, including the multiple rinses of all instrnments,
first in tap water and then in distilled water and finally
in sterile water after soaking and rinsing in detergent
solution. (R. 647-651, 667). This was the same 1technique
1rhich had been in use throughout her employment at the
LDS Hospital, a period of some 13¥2 years. (R .642, 654).
Mr. David Wirthlin, associate administrator at the
hospital, testified that so far back as records were available, thait is to 1962, the hospital's records indicated that
an average of more than 1,000 spinal anesthetics were
administered annually to surgical patients and Calvin's
ease was the only reported case of paraplegia or other
serious complications following spinal anesthetic. (R.
677-678). This fit,1Jre did not include obstetrical cases
where spinal anesthetics are also commonly used. In the
only year for which records were available, 1967, more
than 200 spinal anesithetics were also given in the obstetrical department without untoward event. (R. 678).
It is a fair inf ere nee that approximately the same numh~r would have been used in prior years. Brent Goates,
the hospital administrator tesitified that in the approximately 20 years he had served the hospital as administrator and assistant administrator, he was not aware
of any otl1er case of paraplegia following spinal anesthetic. (R. 450). To the same effect was ~the testimony of
Dr. Schricker. (R 772). This in itself is very strong
1
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evidence of the propriety of the techniq1w sin ·r h
.
.
, ce 1 l'l'a~.
m techmque occur there are usually several inci'd
.
en 1sand
not just one isolated one. (R · 570) · Plaintiff s' expert
Dr. Rocovich, admitted that he could not nanw am,
~rticle in the medical literature which reported a sing!~
isolated case of detergent poisoning. (R. 570).
Mr. Wirthlin's testimony also developed that Yale
cleaner, the detergent in quesition, was marketed h
Becton-Dickinson, a reputable manufacturer of hospit;I
instruments, and was recommended by it for use in
cleansing needles and syringes. It was developed originally for factory use. (R. 723, Ex. 16).
Dr. Harvey -Wong, a board certified anesthesiologi~t.
who was chief of anesithesiology at LDS Hospital at the
time of the incident in question, testified that he wa.'
familiar with medical literature published before m;
indicating the hazards of detergent contamination, !hat
he was aware of the use of detergents by the LDS Hoi
pital in the cleansing of its instruments and that he
considered this in accordance with the sitandard of rare
of this community at that time, particularly in view of
the excellent record of no untoward incidents om 1
long period of time. (R. 681-685). He also pointed on!
on cross-examination that adverse reactions to spinal
anesthetics were reported long before detergents wm
known. (R. 690).
1

Mr. Brent Goates, the hospital administrator, \eiti
fied that the administraition must rely upon its profei
sional staffs for recommendations which are technical
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in nature and that the Department of Anesthesiology had
nrver recommended any changes in the cleansing techniques employed by the hospital. (R. 451). Even plaintiffs' expert, Dr. R.ocovich, admitted that in technical
areas standards of hospitals must be, set by appropriate
specialty groups, and that hospital administrations must
rely on staff people for advice on technical problems.
(R. 562). To the same effect was the tesitimony of Dr.
),faier. (R. 369).

Dr. Louis Schricker, who had very impressive
crrdentials in the field of neurosurgery (R. 727-729),
testified that the cleansing technique was in accordance
1rith the standard of care of this community at 1that
time. (R. 742).
Lorraine Dickson, a nurse anesthetist of 17 years
experience at St. Mark's Hospital, testified that St.
Mark's used esse:nitially the same cleansing technique,
and particularly, used detergents in cleansing its spinal
instruments and in fact was still doing so up to the time
of trial. (R. 714, 716, 719-720). She was not aware of any
incidents of paraplegia having occurred at St. Mark's
Hospital following spinal anesthesia in ~he 17 years
she had been there. (R. 720).
Dr. Schricker testified that according to his information Holy Cross Hospital of Salt Lake City also used
detergents in cleansing its spinal instruments. (R. 7607Gl). Thus, the evidence was :that all of the three major
hospitals in Salt Lake City used detergents in their
cleansing techniques and there was no evidence whatso-
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ever as to what other hospitals in the Salt Lak
.
· e area or
m the strute used. (R. 761).
Dr. Schricker also testified that there coul<l hr.
more than one cleansing technique which wonld be within
the standard of care of the community, (R. 772); and Dr.
Wong testified that there were differences of opinion
within the profession as to how equipment should ht
cleaned. (R. 687).
1

1

C - THE EVIDENCE AS TO CAUSATION.

As with the issue of negligence, the only evidencr :
offered by plaintiffs on the issue of causation was the
testimony of Dr. Rocovich. (R. 509, 515). Among other
infirmities in his testimony, Dr. Rocovich admitted that
he was not an expert in detergents, and that he bad
never seen a case of paralysis or injuries resulting from
detergent contamination. (R. 544). Again, his views were
based entirely upon a reading of the records and alleg11l
medical research. (R. 551).
The cause of Calvin's paraplegia was at best highl:
obscure. (Ex. 1, p. 1; R. 319, 366, 397). He was examined
by many experts during his stay at the LDS Hospvtalanrl
as many as eight or nine different possibilities as to the
cause of his condition were suggested. These included
allergic reaction (to medication or contamination); im·
muno-chemical reaction (to medicrution or contaminant):
bacterial infection, hematoma, hamartoma, concun'.n!
independent infection, abscess and contamina:tion of rn·
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struments (bacterial or chemical). (Ex. 1; R. 348-349,
35~, 385, 398, 402, 730, 731, 734, 735, 736, 738). Some of
these causes were eliminated during the course of his
hospital care either by surgical explorntion or by the
clinical course of the disease process itself. (R. 421, 745,
746, 747, 7G5). However, at the time Calvin was discharged from the LDS Hospital the cause of his adhesive
arachnoidi1tis was still shown as "Unknown." (Ex. 1, p.
1).

The three doctors who testified and who ventured to
express an opinion as to causation (Drs. Maier, Rocorich and Schricker) were in agreement that all of the
possible causes could be eliminated as probable causes
except two. (R. 504-505, 506, 745, 746, 747, 765). Dr.
SchrickPr and Dr. Maier, the two doctors who had the
most to do with Calvin's care throughout his course at the
LDS Hospital, were of the opinion that the most probable
cause was a reaction to the anesthetic medication. (R. 402,
±04, 424, 747, 766). However, Dr. Maier could not rule
ont with certainty detergent conitamination as a possible
cause. (R. 402). Dr. Rocovich on the other hand was of the
opinion that detergent contamination was the most probahle cause but he could not rule out reaction to the medication. (R. 509, 515, 577). Dr. Schricker and Dr. Maier
gave several convincing reasons for their opinions, some
of which were as follows :
1. Tt was dt>finitely known that the plaintiff had
Meived a dose of pontocaine. (R. 404). This is known to
~ause reactions in a few patients (Ex. 6; R. 386, 732).
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There was nothing but speculative evidence tli t I
· a ie ha1
ever received even a minute amount of detergent. ·
2. The clinical course followed by the patient wa,
consistent ·with reaction to anesthetic and incons· t .
is en:
with 1the reported case histories of detergent contamina
tion. Calvin, in effect, never came out of the anesthek
The effects were immediate and irreversible. Patient
who sustain injury from detergent contamination usualli
do not experience severe symptoms for sewral weet'
or even months following administration. It takes time
for detergent contamination to work its mischief. (R

404,405, 743, 744,771).

3. Paralysis and other symptoms of meningitJ~
caused by detergent contamination usually follow a he
nign course and the patient recovers spontaneously witl1
in a period of days. ( R. 423). In this instance the res1tlt5
were permanent and irreversible.
4. The damage to 1the spinal cord was extensiw
over most of its length from the level of the eleventl1
dorsal vertebra to the lower lumbar region. (R. 740). It
is unlikely that such profound damage could have re·
sulted from a minute amount of detergent as compared
to a normal dosage of pontocaine. (R. 745, 766, 771).

5. 'Where meningitis results from contaminate~ in·
struments, there is usually a series of cases, and notJmt
an isolated one. (R. 570).
In addition to the above, there was tl1e evi·aence that.

the seller of the pontocaine put in every package sold, ill
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acPordancc with requirements of the Food and Drug
1

Atlministration, a warning that serious consequences,
including paraplegia and paralysis, on rare occasions
sometimes follow spinal anesthetic. (Ex. 6; R. 386, 387,

412, 413, 554, 744).
Plaintiffs' entire theory of causation rests solely
upon an assumption, wholly unsupported by any direct
evidence, that there was de1tergent contamination of the
anesthetic equipment. From a tragic result, plaintiffs
attempt to reason backward to a case of liability. They
seek to lift themselves by their own booitstraps.
D - OTHER PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE ARISING AT TRIAL.
Plaintiffs called as their first witness Dr. Carl
Brockbank. (R. 276 et seq.). Although leave was sought
to e:icamine him as an adverse or hostile witness, permission to do so was refused by the court in view of the
fact 1that he was no longer a party to the action and
manifestc>d no hostility to the plaintiff. (R. 276-277).
Dr. Brockbank testified generally to the course of the
plaintiff under his care from the time of the initial office
examination on December 11 ull'til the time his total care
was referred to Dr. Schricker. (R. 278-298). On crossexamination, after reviewing several entries in the hospital chart (Ex. 1), he corrected some of his testimony
on dired examination and admitted thaJt he had been
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notified of Calvin's elevated temperature on th

.

e evemn,,

of surgery and not the following morning as he ha;
earlier testified. (R. 299-302).
None of Dr. Brockbank's testimony was nnfavorablP
to plain1tiff s. It served to establish a factual backgronnrl
for the later critical testimony of others on the basic ,
issues of negligence and causation. Dr. Brockbank ex.
pressed no opinion whatsoever on those critical issuei.
His testimony also tended to exclude his treatment, aud
that of Dr. Maier, as possible causes of plaintiff's
mJunes.
1

However, on the following day Dr. Brockbank was
recalled by the plaintiff and was subjected to an argnmentaJtive interrogation for the purported purpose of
laying a foundation for impeaching him by interrogating
him with regard to certain statements which he had al·
legedly made to one Evelyn Lloyd, a family friend of
the plaintiffs. (R. 429, 431). He denied at trial, as he
had denied on deposition, that he had ever made the
statemenits imputed to him (R. 434-435), namely that he
had said that the hospital hired unskilled people to do
important jobs, that Calvin's injury resulted from con·
taminated instruments or detergent on instruments, ana
tha t he ought to sue for more money. (R. 432). Owr
violent objections of the defendant this testimony 1133
received on the authority of Rules 20 and 22, Rules of
Evidence as adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah.
1

(R. 432-433).
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Plaintiffs were then permitted to call Evelyn Lloyd
and she was permiltted to testify (over objection, and for
the alleged purpose of impe aching Dr. Brockbank) as to
conversations she had with Dr. Brockbank in which he
allegedly said that Calvin's condition was the result of
dirty equipment - a dirty needle - probably with a
residue of detergent, and also that the hospital hired
people off the street and gave them little salary and
training for a very vital job. (R. 437-438). She further
testified that similar views were repeated in several
subsequent conversa:tions throughout the month. (R. 438439). Thus in the guise of impeaching their own witness
plaintiffs were successful in getting before. the jury
hearsay evidence which was highly prejudicial to the
hospital, and which was otherwise wholly inadmissible.
1

In support of plaintiffs' claim for damages, plaintiffs called Dr. Paul L. Hannon, a Ph.D., to testify as to
Calvin's economic loss. (R. 579). This witness testified
that he had made a study of the economic loss which
would be sustained by a 20 year old male paraplegic.
(R. 583). He had gaJthe·red data from the Bureau of
Census and other publications, (all unidentified). He had
conducted "a survey of experts." Out of this so-called
study he had applied his own judgment and had come
up with "some sort of figure." (R. 583). On the basis
of this foundatron he was permitted to testify, over obj<'ction of the def endan1t, that the loss sustained by a
college graduate would he $300,000.00 and the loss by a
high sehool graduate $200,000.00. (R. 590-592). Inter-
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estingly, the higher figure coincides with the ve r d'le t for
general damages awarded to the plaintiff Calvin Joh ~
(R. 238).
neon.
Upon cross-examination the witness admiitted thalht
h~d no acq~aintance with tlrn plaintiff, knew nothing o!
his academ:tc record or of his vocational ambitions 01
aptitudes. The figures he used were nothing more than
gross averages. (R. 593). The figures were national
figures not limited to Utah or to 1the western states,
although he admitted earnings varied widely from ont
locality to another, and that Utah is among the lower
income states in the union. (R. 594). He further admittea
that he had not taken into account state and federal in.
come taxes and that his estimates were gross figures
(R. 595). However, he did admit 1that there was f>conomic
certainty that there would be income taxes as far aheaa
as anyone can foresee and that something would have to
be taken out of his estimates to give a true value in tenm
of actual loss ito the plaintiff. (R. 595).
On re-direct eX'amination he testified that he ha1l
surveyed about twenty people whom he considered to he
experts in some field. These included economists, th1
Director of Rehabilitati·on Center at 1the University Medical Center, the Director of Research at Utah State ana
"similar experts." (R. 600). He admitted 1that he "wantei!
their opinions before I made my judgment" and that ht
took their opinions and came up with his opinions. (R
601-602). Defendant then moved to strike his entll
testimony on the grounds that it was based upon hearsa).

1

I
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conjecture and speculation. The court reserved ruling on
the motion at that time (R. 604), but subsequently denied
it. (R. 790).
E -

SUMMARY

At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence defendant
movr,d 1to strike the testimony of Dr. Rocovich and for
a directed verdict. (R. 640-641). Both motions were
denied. (R. 641). Thereafter, at the conclusion of the
entire evidence the motion for directed verdict was renewed and again denied. (R. 790). The case was submitted to the jury which reJturned a verdict in favor of
plaintiff Calvin Johnson for general damags in the
am01mt of $300,000.00 and to, his father for special damages in the undisputed amount of the medical bills,
$25,623.79. (R. 238). Thereafter, defendant made a motion
for judgmen1t notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial which motion was argued to the
court, ~aken under advisement and subsequently denied.
(R. 253, 260). This appeal followed. (R. 262).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING THE
OPINION TESTIMONY OF DR. ROCOVICH CONCERNING THE STANDARD OF CARE OF HOSPITALS IN THIS COMMUNITY.

This court has traditionally and consistently followed
what is commonly called the strict locality or vicin~ty
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rule with respect to medical malpractice litigat'
ion. 1Tnrir·
this rule the plaintiff has the burden of showin{)' ff' . '
.
ha 1r111i
tively that the defendan1t did not exercise reasona\'i
,
le
care an d slnll ordinarily exercised bv•1 other pract't·
1 toner.
of the same school and of the same specialty standin'" 11
the sanie locality. Baxter v. Snow, (1931) 78 u. ;Ji.
2 P.2d 257; Baker v. Wycoff, (1938) 95 U. 199, 79 P.!1J 1
77; Edwards v. Clark, (1938) 96 U. 121, 83 P.2d 1021.
Anderson v. Nixon, (1943) 104 U. 262, 139 P.2d 21fl:
Hitggins v. Hicken, (1957) 6 U. 2d 233, 310 P.2d 5~~:
Marsh v. Pemberton, (1959) 10 U. 2d 40, 347 P.2d 110~.

l

A very interesting case recently decided by the Conn
of Appeals for 1the Tenth Circuit is Miirphy v. Dy1r
(1969) 409 F. 2d 747. In that case plaintiff brought action
against an obstetrician practicing in Colorado Spring'
Colorado, and alleging that his negligent administration
of spinal anesthetic resulted in neurologieal deficiencie;
akin to those sustained by 1the plaintiff here. Plaintiffi
offered the testimony of Dr. Daniel Moore, a renowneu
anesthesiologist and an acknowledged expert in tlia1
field, from Seattle, Washington. On objection of the defendant, the testimony of Dr. Moore was excluded, in lhe
absence of a showing that he was familiar with tbP
standards practiced in Colorado Springs or similar com
munities and for the further reason that his special\:.
'
was different from 1that of the defendant. The court 1
noted that Colorado followed the Restatement rule as set
forth in the Restatement of Torts 2d, ~299A, to which we
shall presently advert. Said the court:
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"There is no predicate in 1this record that Dr.
Moore was familiar with the prevailing practices
in Colorado Springs or that the anesthesiologists
in Colorado Springs follow the 'generally adhered
to' textbook standards of Dr. Moore. Dr. Dyer
recognized Dr. Moore as 'one of many authorities'
in the field but he said he did not follow Dr.
Moore's technique. While it may no1t make good
evidentiary sense to say that a renowned specialist
is incompetent to testify concerning standards of
care in the practice of his specialty, it does seem
to be the prevailing rule in Colorado.... Likewise
the plaintiff made no showing 1that the standards
of administering a spinal anesthetic would be the
same for a certified obstetrician as for a certified
anesthesiologist. In the area of professional standards the law is guided by expert testimony. Without this showing plaintiff failed, as a matter of
law, to qualify Dr. Moore to testify relating to the
facts in this case. The exclusion was proper and
must be sustained."
The logic of the court as above quoted appears to be
fully applicable here and, we submit, should be followed
here. Other cases of like import are Bryant v. Biggs,
(1951) 331 Mich. 64, 49 N.W. 2d 63; Naccarato v. Grob,
(1968) 12 Mich. App. 130, 162 N.W. 2d 305; Michael v.
Ro/Jerts, (1941) 91 N.H. 499, 23 A. 2d 361; Correia v.
U.S. (1964) (1st Cir.) 339 F.2d 596; and Lockhart v.
Maclean, (1961) (Nev.) 361P.2d670.
Most of the cases involving this general question
involve claims against doctors or other practitioners of
the healing arts such as osteopaths, chiropractors, etc.
However, it seems to be implied and understood thaJt the
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same rules are applicable to hospitals. On"" sueI1 ca,~
. •
dealing with the liability of a hosr)ital is Di.ck1•·i1S0111·
Malliard, et al., (1970) (Ia.) 175 N.W. 2d 588. In tlir;:
case the court held that the correct sitandard of caret,,
which hospitals should be held was that which obtaineri
in hospitals generally under similar circumstances. Iii
deciding what are "similar circumstances," the jury nm
con.sider the customs and practices followed in the pa;.
iti.cular community and like communities. The court aho
specifically pointed out that there must be competenteii.
dence upon which to find that a hospital has faile<l I'!
meet the standard of care required of it.
The Restatement of Torts 2d has adopted a rult
slightly more liberal than the traditional rule of tlii~
state, as set forth in §299A:
"Unless he represents that he has greater or
less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes t"
render services in the praetice of a profe~sion m
trade is required to exercise the skill and k11011l
edge normally possessed by members of that prn
f ession or trade in good standing in similar COii
m icnities ." (Emphasis ours.)
The strict locality or vicinity rule fixes the standarJ
of care as that which prevails in the community wheri
the defendant practices. The Restatement rule enlarge'
this to fix the standard as that prevailing in similai
. ·
A s pomte
· d ou t m
· th e con1ment· thereunder,
commumtrns.
11
there are valid reasons for this. Under eomment (g) t1
1

reporter sta1te s:
111
"
The standard is rather that of pe~·s.ons
·
·
·
·
·
·
·1ar
localities
cnn
gaged in similar practice m s1m1
1
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sidering geographical location, size, and the character of the community in general.
"Such allowance for the type of community is
most frequently made in professions or fr~des
where there is a considerable degree of variation
in the skill and knowledge possessed by those
practicing it in different localities. It has commonly been made in the cases of physicians or
surgeons, because of the difference in the medical
skill commonly found in different parts of the
United States, or in differenrt types of communities .... "
We recognize that some writers have advocated a
complete abandonment of the locality rule and the adoption of national standards. The reasons commonly asserted for this position are thait the profession itself
has national board examinations and national standards
to which its specialist must adhere and that the medical
profession recognizes no local variation, and that therefore the com1ts should not either. This thinking has been
followed by some courts. In the recent case of K ronke v.
Danielson, (1972) (Ariz.) 499 P .2d J 56, the court said:

"It is well known that the various specialties of
medicine have set up uniform requirements for
certification of specialists. The length of residency training, subjects to be covered, and even
examinaJtions are established by the national
boards. Since medicine recognizes a standard for
speciali·sts not based on geography, the law should
join in upholding such standards.
"We hold that, for a plaintiff to recover in a
medical malpractice case involving a specialist,
he must prove that the defendant specialist in
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hi~ acts failed to meet the sitandard ( f , ,.
J CU>t• 1
· ·
.
d of p h ys1cians
qmre
m the same s11ec1'al't.
1
.
·
·
t JCed by the defendant. To qualifi1 aii. ex·.Y ,prar
., ·
· .
,;
11 ti 1 /.,
1

an opmion on what that standard t'
· l"
o rn1,
isfff o~ iet spec~a ity of the defendant, the )!artd
o erzng ie witness nmst establish the 1cit 1 ,,
knowledge a nd familiarity with the sta11rlrll';i,,
c~re and treatrn_ent commonly practiced by )Jhii.,i
cians engaged in the same type of sveciality a
the defendant." (Emphasis ours.)
·
~xpress

tl

7

1

Interestingly enough, the ubiquitous Dr. Rocovicl
whose activitie s in Utah give rise to the present CM,
likewise was the doctor involved in the Kronke cast.
Although 1that fact does not appear in the formal opinion
of the court as reported under the above citation, the
original order of the court, quoted in the case of Hoefftl
v. Campbell, (1972) (Ariz. App.) 494 P.2d 777, makei
clear that the same Dr. Peter Rocovich is involved.

1

1

1

The reasons commonly advanced for departing from
the local or similar community standard tn a nrutionaJ
standard do not exist in this case. Although Dr. Roro·
vich on direct examination testified that he was "boanl
qualified," (R. 474), he was forced to admit, on cross
examination, that he had flunked the board examination'
for his specialty on the only occasion on which he toot
them. (R. 538-539). Thus he not only was not boarn
certified but bv te,st, was not board qualified. He further
admitted that. he did not belong to a single special~ ·
society which was national in scope. (R. 482). He did no!
.
Co11 ege of Surgeo ns .or to. an1.·.
belong to the American
other professional society which wais selective ID ib
1
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admissions standards beyond a mere requirement of
having been licensed to practice medicine. (R. 539).
On the basis of his lack of qualifications as to any
kind of a national standard, the testimony of Dr. Rocovich should no t have been received, even with regard to
the standard of care of a neurosurgeon practicing in this
community. Ho~wever, there was no neurosurgeon named
as defendant. The defendant was a hospital. With respect to the proper cleansing and sterilizing of anesthetic
supplies the hospital relied for rts technical advice on, its
Department of Anesthe siology staff members. Just as
it was beyond the province of Dr. Moore to testify as to
the standard of care of an obstetrician pracJticing in
Colorado Springs, it was beyond the province of Dr.
Rocovich to testify as to the standard of care of a hospital or an anesthesiologist practicing in Salt Lake City.
1

1

1

We respectfully suggesit that any relaxation of the
traditional locality rule should be undertaken with the
utmost caution. Any such relaxation invites the 1testimony of foreign quacks and charlatans who are nothing
more than professional witnesses without erither professional qualifications or conscience. If the doors are
to be opened to the testimony of professional witnesses
from ou tside the state to testify as to the standards of
care of local professionals, care should be taken that such
alleged experts are in fact what they purport to be, and
that they do have those professional qualifications which
would qualify them to pass judgment upon the pro1
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fessional conduct of local physicians. Such a showing.
1
completely absent he,re.
~

Under the traditional locality rule which th'is court
has he.retofore consist:ntly followed, the testimony of Dr.
Rocovich
was clearly madmissible · Even under tli e mon
.
liberal rule (which has never yet been followed by till.'
·1 ·
court), no proper foundation for the testimony of Dr. 1
Rocovich was ever laid, and it would be equally inadmis,.
ible under that rule. For this reason alone, the judgment
should be reversed.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE
AT THE END OF PLAINTIFFS' CASE AND AGAIN
AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AND IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION "A" WHICH WAS A REQUEST FOR A PEREMPTORY INSTRUCTION AND
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V.

The only evidence offered by the plaintiffs in snpporl
of their claim that the defendant was negligent in ih
procedures for cleansing anesthe1tic instruments and sup·
plies was the testimony of Dr. Rocovich. If this court
rule's, as we advocate it must, that such testimony irni
.
· d and should haw.·
erroneously and improperly
receive
.
· the rec-0rd
been stricken, there remams no ev1·aence m

1
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npon which a jury could base a finding of negligence
upon the part of the defendant.
It is true that a couple of witnesses testified in
response to questions propounded by plain.tiffs' attorney
that if the hospital furnished the anesthesiologist with
a needle contaminaJted with detergent such would fall
below the standard of care of this community. However,
there was no fotmdation for such questions. There was no
evidence that the needle was contaminated except such
as could be inferred from the fact that an accident occurred. It is axiomaJtic, of course, that the mere occurrence of an accident is no evidence whatsoever of any
negligence upon the part of the actor. Jackson v. Colsto n,
(1949), 116 Ut. 295, 209 P.2nd 566. Under the Utah
authorities cited under Point I and under general principlt>s of negligence law the plaintiff simply failed to
make a prima facie case and the court should have
directed a verdict in defendant's favor, and having failed
to do that, should have granted defendant's motion for
a judgment n.o.v.
1

The language of this court in Jackson v. Colston,
supra, is apropos here:
"Analyzing the testimony to d~termine whether or
not plaintiff has sustained a burden of proving a
causal connection between the alleged negligent
acts of the defendants and the injury to the plaintiff, -vve find that under the present record the
jury would be required to speculate and guess on
too many elements in the chain of causation."
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING, AND IN
REFUSING TO STRIKE, THE TESTIMONY OF THE
WITNESS PAUL HARMON.

As noted in our Statement of Facts, the so-callPii
expert opinions rende,red by Dr. Harmon were not baseil
upon any testimony or evidence received at <trial or upoi
any identifiable government documents or other math 1
of public record. They were admittedly and candidh
based upon unidentified statistical information obtaine;:
from the Bureiau of Census and upon the opinions IJ!
some twenty alleged experts in various fields, none oi :
whom appe ared as a witness in court and none of who,
personal views were even communicated to the court. The
authorities are uniform in holding that expert testimon:
must be based either upon actual knowledge of the exper
himself or upon facts of which there is evidence in thP
record. Neither of these conditions are presffilt here.
1

The rule is stated in 2 Jones on Evidence, §421, I'·
794 as follows :
"While as noted in the foregoing sections. all
expeirt 'witness may base an opinion upon his 1er :
sonal knowledge or observwtions, or upon teflt
mony which has been given by others and 1rlwl,
has been heard or read by him, it is ti:e settl111
rule that an expert may not give in e~ulcnce ni,
opinion which is based upon information ga1111 1
of others oidside the cdoiidrl
f rom the statements
· such case t h e op1mon
· · s won! 1
roorn since in
pend ~pon hearsay." (Emphasis ours.)
1

and at page 796 the same author says:
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"Likiwrise, the opinion of an expert witness however well qualified he may be, may not b~ predicated either wholly or in part upon opinions,
inferences or conclusions of other witnesses either
'
expert or lay. "

To the same effect is 31 Am Jur 2d 546, Expert and
Opinion Evidence, §42 :
"The opinion of an expert cannot be based either

im whole or vn part upon the opinions, inferences,

and conclusions of other witnesses, although he
may express an opinion based upon facts tesitified
to, or upon a test made, by another expert witness. . . . The same stringeint rule opera!tes to
exclude testimony of experts given in answer to
hypothetical questions which incorporate opinions,
inferemces, and conclusions of others, as where the
questions are asked directly on those opinions,
inferences, and conclusions.

"A witness cannot be allowed to give an opinion
based on hearsay or his own idea of what the
evidence was or might have been .... " (Emphasis
ours.)
See also 32 C.J.S. 266, Evidence §546(63):
"The opinion of an expert witness must be based
on facts in evidence, and cannot be based on opinions, conclusions, or inferences of others. However, it may be based on facts testified to· by
others." (Emphasis ours.)
and op. cit., p. 268 :
"Ordinarily an expert witness may not base his
opinion on facts derived from sources other than
the evidence in the case, and he may not state a
judgment based on mere conjecture... ·
1
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"Except in special circumstances ex ··t ..
. 1i is
. based on hearsa
' . pr1
o1n;1
· ·
evi·aence w 7uc
'.'
'7l S t1
. .
. 1y is inar/111,,

e. o _ie op~nion of an :xpert may not 111 i··
dicated, either in whole or in part 011 tl,
. .1
·inf erences, an d conclus1011s
.
. ,c O]Jilll11
of other'' .1
1
. .
. f
o, \\ J1•t1,··
1

i J_

1,

sue 1 op1mons, m erences, and conclnsions h th
of other experts or of lav witnesses·,, (E, e1°'
rnpia •.'
·
•·
ours. )
The following cases are illustrative of the rnl··
State of New Jersey, etc. v. Lichtman., et al., (1961) t'.i
N.J. Super. 386, 169 A. 2d 184; State v. Grvrez, (19µ,
61 Ariz. 296, 148 P.2d 829; O'Brien v. Wallacr, (19ji,
137 Colo. 253, 324 P.2d 1028; Zelenka v. Ind. Comm., llij
0 St. 587, 138 N.E. 2d 667:

1

1

". . . it is well settled that the opinion of a11 r.
pert witness cannot be predicated either in 1rl1ril
or
part itpon the opinions, inferencl's a11d co,,
clusions of others, whether expert or lay 1ri1

vn

nesses." (Emphasis ours.)

The prejudicial effect of this tes timony is clear!:
indicated by the jury verdict which is in the highPil
amount suggested by the witness as the probable eco·
nomic loss to the plaintiff over the course of his lifetirn1"
The jury did not even deduct from 1the amount of thP 1
verdict any amount for income tax which would surel1
have been taken from the earnings of the plaintiff ai
even Dr. Harmon readily conceded on cross-examination ,
1

Expert testimony should be received with consider·
able caution since the expert to a degree performs tlw
function of 1the trier of fact in expressing opinions on
ultimate issues of fact. Care should be taken that tbe~e

I
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opinions truly are the conclusions of an expert and that
they are based upon evidence received in court and are not
mere guesses, or based upon investigation conducted
hy the expert outside the courtroom as to which there is
no evidence and as to which there is no opportunity for
cross-examination.

The testimony of Dr. Harmon wholly fails to meet
the minimum requirements for admission of expert testimony and clearly should have been rejected, and having
once been received, should have been stricken on defendant's motion.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL TO RECALL DR. BROCKBANK
FOR THE PURPOSE OF LAYING A FOUNDATION
FOR IMPEACHMENT AND IN RECEIVING THE
HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF MRS. LLOYD FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES.

We recognize that under Rule 20 of the Rules of Evidence a party may in a proper ca:se impeach his own
witness. However, we do not think that it was the intent
or purpose of the rule to open doors wide for the admission of testimony, otherwise inadmissible, under the guise
of impeachment.
1

Dr. Brockbank was called as a witness by the plaintiff at trial. He testified at some length and in considerable detail as to his role in the Calvin Johnson incident. His testimony was in substanJtial accord with
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his testimony on deposition. The only deviat1·0
n nofrrl
was that on deposition, and on direct examin t' "
.
. .
a ion a
trial, he testified that he received notice of Calv' ,
msele
vated temperature on the early morning of December It
by telephone call from the hospital. However, he wasarl
mittedly uncertain about the time of receiving the ca~
On cro1ss-examination at trial, after reviewing several
1
entries in the hospital chart, all of which tended to inili
cate that the call was on the evening of December 13, Dr.
Brockbank concluded that the call must have been re
ceived at that time ratlrnr than the next morning. Em
if this represented a departure from his prior testimon1 1
it was not a significant one.
Plaintiffs' own witnesses, Drs. Rocovich and Maier,
te stfied that the damage to plaintiff1s spinal cord octnr·
red immediately after injection of the spinal anesthetlc.
and within an hour or two was wholly irreversible. Frow
the standpoint of liabiMy o.f the hospital it made m:
little difference whether Dr. Brockbank received the call
on the evening of December 13 or on the morning of De·
cember 14. There wa,s, therefore, no apparent need,
justification nor excuse for attempting to impeach him.
Nonetheless, he was recalled on the second day of ~rial
and interrogated as to statements he allegedly made
shortly after the incident occurred, charging the hospital
with the grossest kind o.f negligence in the hirin~ of its
· d rn
· th e c1eans1·ng of rnstrn·.
employees and care exercise
ments. All of this Dr. Brockbank had denied on depost·
1

tion and denied at trial.
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Plaintiffs then called Mrs. Lloyd to testify as to a
series of conversations which she had with. Dr. Brockbank, all of which were hearsay as to the hospital, in
which Dr. Brockbank allegedly made statements highly
critical of tht~ hospital and assigning the blame for the
incident to it. Clearly this testimony could no1t have
been received as independent evidence of negligence on
the part of the hospital since it was hearsay of the
rankest sort. It was received only on the preteX!t of
impeaching Dr. Brockbank's testimony. Yet there was no
reason to impeach Dr. Brockbank. This was a clear
abuse of the impeachment process and by use thereof
plaintiffs got before the jury testimony highly prejudir,ial fo the defendant which was clearly inadmissible. We
are unable to find any reported case where this procedure
has ever been attempted, much less condoned.
On this appeal we have not made the contention that
the verdict is excessive as a matter of law. We do observe, however, thaJt it was extremely high for this locality. We are not able to find that any jury in this state
in either the state or federal court has ever returned a
verdict of this proportion for any kind of injury to one
person. While we recognize the seriousness of plaintiff's
injury, we point out that a verdict of a substantially
leHser amount might well have been awarded as adequate
compensation for plaintiff's loss. The enormity of the
verdict here almost certainly resulted from the improperly admitte-d testimony of Dr. Harmon, and quite probably
from the highly inflammatory hearsay tes timony of Mrs.
1
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LJoyd. Defendant was clearly prejudiced by th
er~~
tion of this evidence.

CONCLUSION
There was no competent evidence in the rerord frorr
which a jury could find negligence upon the part of thi
defendant hospital or that plaintiff's injuries resultaj
from any negligence on the part of the hospital. The
verdict and judgment entered thereon should be setasine
with directions to enter judgment in favor of the defenn.
ant and agains1t the plaintiff, no cause of action. Atilie
verv least defendant is entitled to a new trial by rea.101
of erroneous and prejudicial rulings on evidence by ilie
trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
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